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A CANADIAN SOLUTION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF
FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS
CARINA NEUMUELLER†

ABSTRACT
The law of directors’ duties in Canada has traditionally not been very
concerned with creditors’ interests. In the context of corporations who
are nearing insolvency, the prevailing view is that the directors owe
question of “who is the company?” Other commonwealth countries have
Court of Canada decision in Peoples v. Wise, Canada has effectively
caught up and surpassed other countries in this regard. The decision
to other stakeholders in the corporation besides shareholders, but this
located in the Canada Business and Corporations Act, is ample means
by which creditors interests will receive protection, while it also ensures
that directors’ discretionary decisions will not be subject to unlimited
liability.

†
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I. INTRODUCTION
porations has been the subject of debate in recent years. Unlike the
judiciary in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, Canadian courts have
traditionally been less willing to consider creditors’ interests. The 1998
decision of Greenberg J. of the Quebec Superior Court in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise signalled a new direction for
Canadian jurisprudence.1 The decision was considered controversial,
and the appeal was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004.2 The
central issue considered was whether directors owe a duty to creditors
when a corporation is on the brink of insolvency. If so, is this duty an
pany as a whole? Or it is an independent, positive duty owed directly to
creditors? These questions had to be answered in light of the existence
of the oppression remedy, which, in contrast to other Commonwealth
Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada restated that, even when a corunder section 122 (1) (a) of the Canada Business Corporations Act3
remains intact. In sum, the corporations’ interests are not to be confused
the fog and establishing a uniquely Canadian approach which is distinct
from the popular Commonwealth approach.

insolvency on those duties. The third part reviews the Commonwealth
case law, and the fourth part contrasts this case law with Canadian jurisprudence, in particular the Peoples
that the oppression remedy is a workable solution. This is an approach
which should not be interpreted as a defeat of creditors’ interests; rather,
it is an approach which successfully balances creditor protection on the
one side and the viability of directors’ decision-making on the other.
1
(1998), 23 C.B.R. (4th) 2004, [1998] Q.J. No. 3571, [1999] R.R.A. 178, 23 C.B.R. (4th) 2004.
[Peoples (QSC) cited to C.B.R.].
2
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68. 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 326
N.R. 267, J.E. 2004 - 2016, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples (SCC) cited to D.L.R.].
3
Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as am. [CBCA].
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II. DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
This duty of loyalty has been developed by the common law courts, but
4
in section 122 (1) (a) of the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA) which reads:
122(1)(a)
their powers and discharging their duties shall…act honestly and in
good faith with a view to the best interest of the corporation.

the corporation.”5 This duty is owed to the corporation itself rather than
to the shareholders directly, and it covers all aspects of the directors’
relationship with the corporation.6
is to deter directors from putting their own interests before those of the
corporation. Entrusted with the large task of managing the assets of the
good faith. In most of the cases where a breach of the duty is found, the
diversion of assets has occurred.7
Due to the high degree of power and control that directors exercise over the company and given that there is a constant opportunity to
engage in self-interested activity, directors are held to the strictest of
duties.8 A contractual duty would not be desirable or feasible, as shareholders cannot be expected to negotiate contracts for themselves at the
time of each investment. Likewise, a regular duty of care would not pro4

Carol Hansell,
vol. 2 (Toronto: Carswell,
1999) at 9-14.
5
J. Anthony Van Duzer, The Law of Partnerships and Corporations, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2004) at 270.
6
Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421.
7
Ibid. at 273. See also Edward M. Iacobucci, “A Wise Decision? An Analysis of the RelationCan.Bus.L.J. 337 at 345.
8
Teck Corp. v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R (3d) 288 (B.S.S.C.), [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385 [Teck cited
to D.L.R.].

DIRECTORS' DUTIES . . . 93

cant amount of power yielded by directors. Due to directors exercising a
level of control “which rises above day-to-day accountability to owning
shareholders and which comes under some scrutiny only at annual general or at special meetings,”9
keeping their powers in check.
Shareholder primacy refers to the fact that the interests of the corporation generally coincide with the interests of the shareholders; namely,
preted as a duty towards the shareholders collectively, that is, “all of the
shareholders, taking no one sectional interest to prevail over the others.”10
ticular case, the court must both consider what the shareholders would
interests of the corporation in the circumstances.11 A court will simply
ask: “what was the primary or governing purpose of the directors’ action?”12 It will then only intervene if the directors’ purpose is improper
and does not serve the interests of the corporation. If the directors cannot prove that they acted on reasonable grounds and in the best interest
acted for an improper purpose.13
The shareholder-primacy rule does not preclude management from
taking into account the effect of a particular action on other stakeholders, however. No corporation will maximize share value if it ignores the
interests of other stakeholders, including creditors. Some propose a more
formalized duty towards the other stakeholders. However, this would
seem to be both unworkable and somewhat redundant, given that when
a business is operating successfully, other stakeholders interests are incidentally promoted.14 The existing shareholder-primacy norm already
allows a high degree of management discretion. It allows directors to
9

Canadian Aero Services v. O’Malley and Zarzycki, [1974] S.C.R. 592, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, 11
C.P.R. (2d) 206 [Canadian Aero Services cited to S.C.R.]. See also Carol Hansell, What Directors need to Know – Corporate Governance 2003 (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) at 98-99.
10
Palmer v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd. (1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 161 at 168, 56
D.L.R. (4th) 128 (Ont. S.C., Div. Ct.).
11
Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 271.
12
Teck, supra note 8 at 312.
13
Teck, supra note 8 at 315-16.
14
Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 444.
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take other stakeholder interests into account though not permitting them
to abandon their primary goal of promoting shareholder interests.15
holders and other stakeholders have been dealt with rather hesitantly by
Canadian courts.16 At some point, creditors may expect directors to admally owed to the corporation, shift towards other stakeholders.”17

III. THE IMPACT OF INSOLVENCY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
as a whole to act with loyalty and in good faith. However, the question
of how the usual duty of directors to act in the best interests of the corporation is affected by the insolvency or near-insolvency of that corporation must still be addressed.18 In the event of insolvency, the question
is whether these general rules are still applicable, or whether the duty
of the directors must shift away from the corporation and towards other
stakeholders, particularly creditors. In other words, when the company
is insolvent, to whom should the directors owe a duty?
down in section 2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act19 (BIA), which
stipulates that a corporation may be found to be insolvent, if:
(a) for any reason, the corporation is unable to meet its obligations
if they generally become due;

15
Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 444. See also Bruce Welling et al., Canadian Corporate Law:
Cases, Notes & Materials, 2nd ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2001) at 297.
16
See for example Forsyth J.’s decision in Re Trizec Corp. [1994] 10 W.W.R. 127 (Alta. Q.B.)
at 16, (1994), 158 A.R. 33, 21 Alta. L.R. (3d) 435, 20 B.L.R. (2d) 202, [1994] A.J. No. 577 [Re
Trizec cited to W.W.R.].
17
See C. Graham W. King, “Extending Fiduciary Principles to the Director-Creditor Relationship: A Canadian Perspective” (2002) 29 Man. L.J. 243.
18
For a comprehensive discussion see Terence M. Dolan, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency Issues” in M. Patricia Richardson, ed.,
(Markham: McCarthy Tétrault, 1997) at Chapter 11 and Andrew Keary “The Director’s Duty to
Take into Account the Interests of Company Creditors: When is it triggered?” (2001) 25 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 315 at 322 [Keary “Director’s Duty”].
19
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, [BIA].
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(b) the corporation has ceased paying its current obligations in the
ordinary course of business as they generally become due; or
(c) the aggregate of the corporation’s property is not, at a fair

of the corporation’s obligations due and accruing due.

When a company is insolvent or near-insolvent, there is little or no equity remaining. It is therefore arguable that the shareholders cease to have
any material interest in the assets of the corporation at insolvency. The
shareholders’ interests may be “considered dormant”20 since, for practical purposes, they have already lost their investment in the corporation
as compared to the creditors, who still have a stake in the company. As
the court in Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Property Limited explained:
in a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders
entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when
questions of the duty of directors arise. … But where a company
is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become
prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation,
to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal
with the company’s assets. It is in a practical sense their assets
and not the shareholders’ assets that, through the medium of the
company, are under the management of the directors pending either
liquidation, return to solvency, or the imposition of some alternative
administration. [emphasis added] 21

In such a situation, does the directors’ duty—once owed to the corporation itself and its shareholders—shift towards the creditors, since they
are the true stakeholders of an insolvent corporation? When a company
becomes insolvent, do “the best interests of the corporation” still equal
“the best interests of the shareholders,” or is it the best interests of the
creditors that now must be given precedence? Before addressing this issue, it will be helpful to outline the basic differences between shareholders’ and creditors’ interests when insolvency arises.

20
Wayne D. Gray “Peoples v. Wise and Dylex: Identifying Stakeholder Interests Upon or Near
Corporate Insolvency – Stasis or Pragmatism?” (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 242.
21
Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Property Ltd. (in Liquidation) (1986), 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722 (C.A.),
[Kinsela].
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At the insolvency stage, the shareholder stake in the company assets appears to have less priority than the creditor stake. This creates
an incentive for the shareholders to encourage the company to engage
in risky investments or bargains. Directors may decide to gamble with
what could end up being the creditors’ funds in the hope of rescuing the
outsiders, the directors may decide to take on additional debt in order to
pay off the interests of already existing creditors. If either of these strategies succeeds, the corporation will recover and the shareholder value
will rise. If the strategies fail, the market value of the company will fall;
however, since the shareholders will have already lost their money, it is
the creditors who will bear the loss from the directors’ decisions during
insolvency.22
motivation of the company and the relative gains of externalising the
cost of debt to create uncompensated risk for the creditors.”23
The creditors, unlike the shareholders will be more interested in
conservative investments which would preserve the remaining assets of
the company. The traditional argument is that it is the creditors’ responsibility to manage the risks which arise out of the corporation’s insolvency since they have the ability to protect their interests. For example,
creditors have the means to bargain effectively by negotiating contracts
which include safeguards such as secured creditor status or increased
rates of interest.24
Where creditors fail to negotiate properly, directors should not serve as
insurers against their poor business judgment. Creditors’ interests can
be distinguished from shareholders’ interests because of the fact that
the shareholders’ claims vary with the success of the business, while
25
The argument

22
David Thomson, “Directors, Creditors and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or a Duty Not to
Oppress?” (2000) 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 31 at 33.
23
Stéphane Rousseau, “The Duties of Directors of Financially Distressed Corporations: A
Québec Perspective on the Peoples Case” (2004) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 368 at 382.
24
Brian Morgan and Harry Underwood, “Directors’ Liability to Creditors on a Corporations’
Insolvency in Light of the Dylex and Peoples Department Stores Litigation” (2004) 39 Can.Bus.
L.J. 336 at 338. See also Andrew Keary “Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns

[Keary “Contractarian Concerns”].
25
Van Duzer, supra note 5 at 445.
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legislation, such as the BIA and section 241(2)(c) of the CBCA (the socalled “oppression remedy”), which accounts for creditors’ interests.
The argument against the protection of creditors’ interests, however,
falters on a critical fact; simply put, it is often true that by the time insolvency law becomes relevant, there are few assets remaining that the creditors can salvage. It is important to remember that the contract intended
the negotiations were entered into, and may fail to be effective against
unforeseen risks. A question then arises as to whether these common
traps of contractual protection are enough to justify the establishment
potential or actual insolvency. The corollary to this proposal is that once
mine at what precise time this duty should arise. Must the corporation
be truly and deeply insolvent, or is it enough if the corporation is “at the
vicinity of insolvency,” a phrase used by some commentators which is
itself problematic for its lack of precision.26
point in a corporation’s life where only the creditors have an economic
interest in the company amounts to an almost insoluble problem. As
Christopher Nicholls explains:
it brings to mind a variation of Zeno’s paradox…before a company
becomes insolvent, there must be an earlier moment when it is almost
insolvent. Before that moment, there must be still an earlier point in
almost almost insolvent. And so on.27

unnecessary, as there are already creditor protection mechanisms available, but may also lead to the problem described above, that is, determining when exactly the duty would be triggered. Another possible solution would be the creation of a directors’ duty towards the company’s
creditors at all times when making business decisions. This however,
would put too high a stress on directors: not only would they have to
26
See, for example, Edward M. Iacobucci, “Directors’ Duties in Insolvency: Clarifying what is
at Stake” (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 398 at 408.
27

(2001) 35 Can. Bus. L.J. 1 at 34. See also Keary “Director’s Duty”, supra note 18 at 326-27.
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act in the interests of the corporation, but they would also have to take
into account the interests of the creditors which, as we have seen, might
be very different from the company’s interests. Indeed, it can be argued
that having to balance all the stakeholders’ interests at all times would
cause directors to act too conservatively, out of fear they may breach
their duty to at least one group of stakeholders. This uncertainty might
make directors avoid making the kind of resolute decisions that are re28
In other words, “infail to trade or assume responsibilities, desist from establishing effective
lines of control and delegate decisions to parties less well positioned to
decide relevant issues.”29 Thus, it would seem that the imposition of a
new duty on directors is not the solution to the problem, nor would a
new duty lead to better corporate management. Rather, it would initiate
a standard of accountability that would not be enforceable, or desirable
in practice.

IV. COMMONWEALTH JURISPRUDENCE
the United Kingdom has dealt with the question of whether directors
will arise. It should be noted that the approaches generally employed in
other Commonwealth jurisdictions contrast sharply with the practice of
Canadian jurisprudence which, until recently, has been more reluctant
to recognize a duty.
A review of existing case law reveals that other Commonwealth
courts have taken divergent views on the nature of the duty owed by directors to creditors. They have tended to take one of two stances on the
ciary duty to act honestly and in good faith in the interests of the corporation. Other courts tend to see it as an independent duty owed directly
to creditors founded either on ordinary principles of directors’ duty of

28

Keary, “Contractarian Concerns” supra note 24 at 681.
Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law – Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge: University Press, 2002) at 544.

29
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care.30 Both of these approaches are relatively recent. The traditional approach to directors’ duties has been to include the shareholders’ interests
and to exclude the interests of the creditors. Indeed, creditors’ interests
have been excluded from the duty even where the creditors’ stake in the
company’s assets is much larger than the shareholders’ stake, which is
often the case in most modern businesses.31
This view changed radically in 1976, when Mason J. in the High
Court of Australia case of Walker v. Wimborne held that, “the directors
of a company in discharging their duty to the company must take account of the interests of its shareholders and its creditors.”32 Mason J.
emphasized that the best interests of the company was not restricted
to shareholder interests but included creditors’ interests as well. In discharging their duty to the corporation, directors should have regard both
for the interests of the company and its creditors. Mason J’s judgment
should not be overstated. A duty owed to creditors directly and individually was not established in this case. Rather, Walker v. Wimborne seems
to stand for the similar ratio as in Kinsela. Street C.J. in Kinsela writes:
“the directors’ duty to a company as a whole extends in an insolvency
context to not prejudicing the interests of creditors.”33 Both Walker v.
Wimborne and Kinsela seem to indicate that insolvency only alters the
relative weight given to shareholders’ interests as opposed to creditors’
creditors.
The New Zealand courts have also considered this issue. In the 1995
case, Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd,.
phasized that:
the duties of directors are owed to the company. On the facts of
particular cases this may require the directors to consider inter
alia the interests of creditors. For instance, creditors are entitled to
consideration, in my opinion, if the company is insolvent, or nearly
insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if a contemplated payment or
other course of action would jeopardize its solvency. 34
30

Ibid. at 499.
See Jacob Ziegel, “Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution – An AngloCanadian Perspective” (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 511 at 517.
32
[1976] 50 A.L.J.R. 446 at 449.
33
Kinsela, supra note 21 at 732.
34
[1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 242 at 249.
31
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Cooke J. went on to state that, “the directors of a company, when declaring a dividend, owe a duty not only to the company but also to its creditors”35. This statement leaves it somewhat unclear as to whether Cooke
J. intended to create a separate duty owed to creditors, or whether the
duty to creditors is part of the larger duty owed to the corporation generally. In the more recent case of Dairy Containers Ltd. v. NZI Bank Ltd.;
Dairy Containers Ltd. v. Auditor-General however, Thomas J. cleared
up some of the ambiguity when he held that, “a company owes a duty to
creditors at least where the company is insolvent or nearly so.”36 From
this jurisprudence, it seems that the New Zealand courts have held that
the interests of an insolvent (or almost insolvent company) are in fact
the interests of existing creditors.
In the United Kingdom, jurisprudence has gone a long way toward
recognizing that the best interests of the corporation may include more
than simply the rights of the shareholders. Moreover, several decisions
show that creditors have been recognized as legitimate stakeholders in a
corporation that is insolvent or nearly insolvent. Yet, as we have seen in
other jurisdictions, the United Kingdom courts have struggled with the
nature of this duty. Do directors owe a direct duty to creditors, or is this
duty subsumed under the broader duty owed to the company? Buckley
L.J. in Horsley & Weight Ltd. (Re), points out that:
[i]t is a misapprehension to suppose that the directors of a company
owe a duty to the company’s creditors to keep the contributed
capital of the company intact….It may be somewhat loosely said
that the directors owe an indirect duty to the creditors not to permit
any unlawful reduction of capital to occur, but I would regard it as
more accurate to say that the directors owe a duty to the company
in this respect. 37

In contrast, Lord Templeman stated in Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd. that in his opinion:
the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its property inviolate
and available for the repayment of its debts….A duty is owed to by
the directors to the company and to the creditors of the company to
35

Ibid.
N.Z.L.R. 701 (H.C.) at 216-17 (1994) (Lexis).
37
[1982] 1 Ch. 442 (C.A.) at 453-54.
36
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ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and
directors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors.38

Lord Templeman, unlike Buckley L.J., seems to recognise a direct duty
owed to creditors, in addition to the general duty owed to the corporation
Templeman considers the duty to arise out of contractual obligations.39
Kuwait Asia
40
Bank EC v. National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. and in the more recent
case of Yukong Line Ltd. of Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. of
Liberia, where Toulson J. explicitly rejected the possibility of a direct
duty owed to creditors. He ruled that:
individual creditor, nor is an individual creditor entitled to sue for
41

To summarize, in the United Kingdom the prevailing view seems to be
event of near insolvency, directors should also take into account the interests of creditors. Accounting for creditors’ interests is “part and parcel of the more general duty owed by directors to act in the best interests
of the corporation.”42
The experience in Australia, New Zealand and The United Kingdom
contrasts sharply with the Canadian jurisprudence detailed below.

V. CANADIAN JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Since the 1885 case of Bank of Toronto v. Cobourg, Peterborough and
Marmora Railway Co.43 it was settled law in Canada that directors owe

38

[1987] 1 All. E.R. 114 (H.L.) at 118.
See also Thomson, supra note 22 at 42.
40
[1990] 3 All E.R. 404.
41
[1998] 4 All E.R. 82 (Q.B.D.) at 99.
42
Morgan and Underwood, supra note 24 at 347-48.
43
(1885) 10 O.R. 376 (Ch.).
39
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existed between these two parties, and this traditional view had been
followed by the courts for almost 110 years. However, in 1994 the case
of Re Trizec Corp.44 seemed to signal a move away from the conventional analysis. Forsyth J. wrote:
duty to creditors when the ability of a company to pay its debts
duty to creditors does not occur at the stage of proceedings where
an arrangement is sought as opposed to a case where liquidation
occurs.45

This passage seems to suggest that whenever there is a transition from
duty, from being owed to the corporation itself to being owed to the
creditors. Consequently, directors are required to balance both the interests of the creditors and the company when making business decisions.
Unfortunately, Forsyth J. did not elaborate on this point. He did not
and shareholders. Although the judgment was a marked departure from
previous case law, this hesitant and rather vague Canadian approach
could hardly be considered a landmark decision when compared to the
clear judgments by the other Commonwealth courts.
1. Peoples – the Trial Decision
Following the tentative decision in Re Trizec Corp, the bold decision of
the Québec Superior Court in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee
of) v. Wise46 in 1998 seemed to change the landscape drastically. The
case arose out of the bankruptcy of Wise Stores Inc. (“Wise”) and its
wholly owned subsidiary Peoples Department Stores Inc. (“Peoples”).
The trustee in bankruptcy of Peoples brought an action against the three
of Wise, and the only directors of Peoples. The trustee claimed that the
Wise brothers, as directors of Peoples, had favoured the interests of
44

Re Trizec, supra note 16.
Re Trizec, supra note 16 at 139.
46
Peoples (QSC), supra note 1.
45
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Wise over Peoples to the detriment of Peoples’ creditors. The trustee
advanced the argument that the Wises’ actions amounted to a breach
of their duties as directors under section 122 (1) of the CBCA. Greenberg J. agreed with this argument and found the Wise brothers liable

duty under section 122 (1) (a) of the CBCA extends to the creditors of a
company when the company is insolvent or in the vicinity of insolvency.
He clearly favoured the school of thought which contends that the creditors replace the shareholders as the true stakeholders of the corporation
follow the propositions made by Jacob Ziegel, who as early as 1993 had
opined on this issue:
…at least where a company is insolvent or near to insolvency, …the
directors’ duties lie not only towards the companies shareholders, but
that they also are bound to act in the best interests of the company’s

creditors’ interests when the going gets rough….If the company
is insolvent, only the creditors still have a meaningful stake in its
assets.47

While he recognized the need to provide some form of protection for
veal the precise nature of the duty. He left open to interpretation whether
insolvency leads to a separate duty owed directly to creditors, or whether insolvency simply changes the way in which the duty owed to the
company should be displayed. Nevertheless, he referred strongly to the
development in other Commonwealth countries and made it obvious
that “Canadian Corporate Law should evolve in that direction.”48
2. Peoples – the Appellate Decision
The Wise brothers appealed to the Québec Court of Appeal. Pelletier
J.A., writing for the Court, reversed the decision of Greenberg J. on all
47
48

Supra note 31 at 511 and 530.
Peoples (QSC), supra note 1 at 200.
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counts.49 Pelletier J.A. refused to accept Greenberg J.’s opinion that in
an insolvent or almost insolvent corporation the interests of creditors are
equal to the best interests of the corporation. He explicitly rejected the
shift of duty proposed by Greenberg J.. Pelletier J. A. reasoned that there
was nothing in the history of the CBCA to justify an expansion of directors’ liability to third parties. He wrote that “it was not the role of the
judiciary to modify the traditional meaning given to the expression ‘the
best interest of the corporation’ in order to create a new liability regime,
since this was the jurisdiction of the legislator.”50 Pelletier J.A. did, on
the other hand, recognize that the creditors’ interests in the management
of a corporation might increase as the corporation nears bankruptcy.51
Most importantly, Pelletier J.A. held that the duty of directors to act in
the best interests of the corporation requires that they protect the legitimate interests of all the shareholders. In effect, the Court of Appeal
recognized that in the event or in the vicinity of insolvency the interests
of creditors gain importance, but clearly refrained from extending the
creditors’ interests.52
3. Peoples – the Supreme Court of Canada Decision
The trustee sought leave appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which
was granted on August 28, 2003.53 On Friday October 29, 2004 Major
and Deschamps JJ., writing for the Court, dismissed the appeal and held
in favour of the three Wise brothers. They wrote:
the phrase the ‘best interests of the corporation’ should not be read
simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholders’. From an economic
perspective, the ‘best interests of the corporation’ means the
maximization of the value of the corporation. However, the courts
have long recognized that various other factors may be relevant in
determining what directors should consider in soundly managing
49

Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) 509, 41 C.B.R.
(4th) 225 (Que. C.A.).
50
See also Rousseau, supra note 23 at 390.
51
Rousseau, supra note 23 at 79.
52
See also Morgan and Underwood, supra note 24 at 357-58.
53
[2003] S.C.C.A. No. 133.

DIRECTORS' DUTIES . . . 105

with a view to the best interests of the corporation….The various
shifts in interests that naturally occur as a corporation’s fortunes

the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of creditors
or those of any other stakeholders. [emphasis added] 54

The Supreme Court thus explicitly distanced itself from the other Commonwealth jurisprudence, which recognizes a shift in the duty whenever a corporation enters a state of insolvency. Rather, the Supreme Court
states that in resolving competing shareholders’ and creditors’ interests,
directors are obliged to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the
best interests of the corporation, and that they must be careful not to favour the interests of any one group of stakeholders. Where it is evident
that the purpose of the directors was to create a “better” company, they
will not be held liable for breach of duty. This will be the case even if
their attempt is unsuccessful, and regardless of whether the corporation is in the “nebulous vicinity of insolvency”. The court found that
55
Major and Deschamps JJ. clearly rejected the need to read the interests of
They pointed to the availability of other means through which the stakeholders can protect their interests. One example of such a tool is he oppression remedy in section 241 (2) (c) of the CBCA, which is unique to
the Canadian legal landscape. The decision of Major and Deschamps JJ.
Creditors are only one set of stakeholders, but their interests are
protected in a number of ways….The oppression remedy of s.
241 (2) (c) of the CBCA and the similar provisions of provincial
legislation regarding corporations grant the broadest rights to
creditors of any common law jurisdiction….The fact that creditors’
is apt to be relevant to, inter alia, the exercise of discretion by a
court in granting standing to a party as a “complainant” under s. 238
(d) of the CBCA as a proper person. 56
54

Peoples (SCC), supra note 2 at paras. 42-43.
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In most countries, the statutory remedies are available only to members
of the corporation, to shareholders only.57 By underlining the importance
of the oppression remedy, The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges
the differences between Canadian and Commonwealth legislative remedies, and this decision leads the way for future cases concerning directors’ liability towards creditors. Due to this landmark decision, the
courts will most likely have to consider the question of whether a credithe CBCA. In light of the Supreme Court decision, Canadians may well
see the courts become more willing to recognize creditors’ standing as
complainants. Given the importance of the oppression remedy, a brief
overview of that remedy and its availability to creditors of a corporation
follows below.

VI. THE OPPRESSION REMEDY
Since its introduction as part of the CBCA in 1975, the oppression remedy has been described as the broadest, most comprehensive and most
open-ended remedy in the common law world. Through the means of
this statutory remedy, shareholders and certain other corporate stakeholders can ensure that their interests are fairly protected in the context of corporate action and decision making.58
only the content of a claim for relief, but also who may claim relief and
what remedies can be sought. The more traditional remedies, such as the
59

Due to the recent
recognition given to creditors by the Supreme Court in Peoples, in this
section I focus on the term “complainant” itself rather than explain in
which circumstances the powers of the directors of a corporation have
been exercised in a manner that is “oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to
or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder [or] creditor,” as per section 241 of the CBCA.
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See for example the Australian Corporations Act 2001, chapter 2F, part 2F.1, section 235.
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The key provisions in the CBCA are sections 238, 241 and 242, and
tled to apply for relief from oppression. Subsections 238 (a) and (d) are
-

son who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an application under this Part.”
Major and Deschamps JJ. stressed creditors’ interests increase as
a corporation nears insolvency. This should impact the discretion of a
court when granting standing to a creditor as a “proper person” under
paragraph 238 (d) of the CBCA. By doing so, both secured and unsecured creditors are recognized as possible parties to an oppression
action. This explicit inclusion of creditors stands in contrast to the traditional reluctance of the courts to exercise their discretion to permit
an action brought by a creditor, even though section 241 (2) expressly
refers to the interests of creditors. In most of the instances in which
creditors have been denied standing, it was argued that the creditor’s
interest in the affairs of the corporation was too remote, that the creditor was not in a position analogous to that of a minority shareholder, or
that the creditor had no particular legitimate interest in the management
of the company.60 Given that creditors can now gain standing, directors
of insolvent companies may be personally liable under the oppression
remedy if creditors are treated unfairly, even if the directors made their
best efforts to act in the best interests of the company. The decisions of
the directors must have a proper corporate purpose that takes into account the reasonable expectations of the corporation’s creditors in the
circumstances under consideration.
Although this development challenges traditional corporate law
notions about who corporate managers are responsible to the Supreme
Court decision should not be seen as a defeat of creditors’ interests.
Rather, it can be seen as an enhancement to the position of creditors
when they are seeking relief under the oppression remedy. Historically,
a creditor has only been considered a “proper person” if the conduct of
60

For a good summary of existing case law see Ziegel, supra note 31 at 528-29 and Thomson,
supra note 22 at 50-51, as well as VanDuzer, supra note 5 at 337-340.
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the directors constituted a breach of the underlying expectation arising from the circumstances in which the creditor’s relationship with the
corporation arose. After Peoples, it is clear that granting standing to a
creditor complainant becomes increasingly likely as the corporation’s
seen as a better instrument for protecting creditors’ interests than a claim

the onerous determination of the precise point in time when the corporation is “nearing insolvency”. Expectedly, the protection offered by the
oppression remedy does not depend on the state of solvency at all, but it
is, “triggered by the oppressive conduct alone and not by some combination of dereliction of duty and near-insolvency.”61
One might argue that the broad scope of the oppression remedy is
an incentive for creditors to convert every action against the corporation into an oppression action. But given the fact that creditors do not
have standing as of right to bring an oppression remedy in every situation, such an outcome is very unlikely. It is still at the discretion of the
court to grant creditors standing as a complainant under section 238 of
the CBCA, however, in light of Peoples, a creditor’s chances of being
The need to consider one’s chances of being granted status as a complainant will prevent claimants from abusing the broad discretionary
remedies.
The Supreme Court of Canada obviously took these nuanced issues
into account when they spoke in favour of the oppression remedy and
Supreme Court has presented the oppression remedy as a workable solution which balances the need for creditor protection on the one hand,
while protecting directors discretion from constant potential liability on
the other.
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Thomson, supra note 22 at 48.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Peoples has given a clear
direction for future developments in the area of directors’ duties. The
near insolvency, or using the oppression remedy as a means to protect
creditors’ interests. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that
by the time creditors can make use of their traditional contractual or
insolvency remedies there is often little money left in the corporation,
it has nonetheless ruled in favour of the oppression remedy and against

corporation only, and that one must be careful not to intermingle creditors’ interests with those of the company.
A review of the Supreme Court’s decision in this case supports the
conclusion that it is a balanced and appropriate ruling. Stated simply,
acknowledgement of a duty owed by directors to take account of the
interests of creditors when the corporation is insolvent or nearing insolvency is not necessary for the protection of creditors’ interests. A distinct
duty owed to creditors would have put them in a better position than the
shareholders who do not have any contractual remedies if the corporation fails and they lose their investments. Moreover, the danger of such
a statutory duty is that directors might start to act overly cautious, and
fail to take even the most reasonable risks.62 In any case, the oppression
not in the best interests of the corporation. In a sense, it is even broader
ment for an oppression action, and such an action can consequently be
applied to a much broader spectrum of behaviour.63 It would have been
protection of creditors given that their interests are already protected.
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See also Keary “Contractarian Concerns”, supra note 24 at 682-83.
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35 Can. Bus. L.J. 55 at 62.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has demonstrated Canadian independence from the Commonwealth jurisprudence and has acknowledged the
uniquely broad statutory oppression remedy available in Canada as a
porate notion that directors owe their duties only to the corporation,
lution for Canadian corporate directors with regards to whose interests
should be privileged while making business decisions.

